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This article examines the impact of monetary policy shocks on the U.S. housing market 
using an identification procedure similar to the one suggested by Uhlig (Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 2005). The identification procedure imposes sign restrictions on 
the response of some variables for a certain period. No restrictions are placed on the 
response of the housing variable. Overall, the results indicate that housing starts and 
residential investment respond negatively to contractionary monetary policy shocks. 
However, the magnitude of the impact is sensitive to the selection of the horizon for 
which the restrictions hold. Moreover, a comparison of the results with those obtained 
from a conventional Choleski decomposition, suggests that the impact of monetary policy 
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 1. Introduction 
There is plenty of evidence in the literature suggesting that the housing market is 
linked to aggregate economic activity in the U.S. (e.g. Iacoviello, 2005). Housing 
investment is an important indicator of household wealth (Case et al., 2005), and at the 
same time is one of the most volatile sectors of the U.S. economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). The importance of the housing market is clearly visible in Figure 1, which plots 
the number of new privately owned housing units starts each year (solid line), and 
recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (shaded areas). It 
is common for a large drop in housing starts to precede a recession.
1 
<<Figure 1>> 
This article examines the impact of monetary policy innovations on the U.S.   
housing market. In a recent testimony before the U.S. Congress, the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Ben S. Bernanke argued that “given the substantial gains in house prices 
and the high levels of home construction activity over the past several years, prices and 
construction could decelerate more rapidly than currently seems likely. Slower growth in 
home equity, in turn, might lead households to boost their saving and trim their spending 
relative to current income by more than is now anticipated,” Federal Reserve Board 
(2006). The events in the housing market have a significant effect on household wealth, 
and thus have a big influence over household behavior.
2 Therefore, a comprehensive 
                                                 
1 The housing market is perceived as having predictive power over the future course of the economy. For 
instance, the Conference Board includes housing starts as an element of its Index of Leading Economic 
Indicators (Fratantoni and Schuh, 2003). Moreover, Green (1997) shows that there is Granger causality 
from housing investment to GDP, while there is no Granger causality from nonresidential investment to 
GDP. 
2 A similar view about the importance of the housing market for analyzing household behavior is shared by 
the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan. In a testimony before the U.S. Congress, 
Greenspan stated that “among the factors contributing to the strength of spending and the decline in saving   3
analysis of the impact of monetary policy on the housing market is necessary in order to 
understand the impact of monetary policy on the whole economy. 
There is an extensive literature on the impact of monetary policy on different 
sectors of the U.S. economy (for some examples in the housing sector, see Ahearne et al., 
2005 and Falk, 1986). Vector autoregressive (VAR) models are commonly used to 
measure the impact of monetary policy innovations. VARs provide a plausible 
assessment of the response of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks 
without requiring a complete structural model of the economy. However, in order to use 
VARs the researcher must identify the monetary policy shock. 
The use of different identification schemes can alter the results significantly. For 
instance, McMillin (2001) shows that the choice between contemporaneous restrictions 
(as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998a), Christiano et al. 
(1998) and Strongin (1995)) and long-run restrictions (as in Fackler and McMillin 
(1998)) can deliver important differences in the magnitude and timing of the response of 
macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks. 
We follow Uhlig (2005) in applying what he calls an “agnostic” identification 
procedure. The identification scheme imposes sign restrictions on the response of some 
of the variables for a certain period, while leaving the response of the main variable of 
interest open. We assume that a contractionary monetary policy shock does not lead to an 
increase in prices, non-borrowed reserves and real GDP, or decreases in the federal funds 
rate for a number of periods after the shock. We impose no restrictions on the response of 
                                                                                                                                                 
have been developments in housing markets and home finance that have spurred rising household wealth 
and allowed greater access to that wealth,” Federal Reserve Board (2005).   4
the measure of housing activity. Hence, the response of this variable is left “agnostically” 
open by the identification procedure. 
The methodology proposed by Uhlig (2005) is a way to impose explicit 
theoretical restrictions in the estimation and, at the same time, to leave the main question 
of interest open. This contrasts with other identification methods used in the literature 
that impose informal restrictions in order to get “reasonable results.” For example, if 
using certain specification, the results show that prices increase after a contractionary 
monetary policy shock, then the model is re-specified to get a more “reasonable result.” 
These results are therefore influenced by a priori theorizing of what is a “reasonable 
result.” Moreover, if the results are not consistent with economic theory it is common to 
call the result a puzzle, as in Sims (1992). In our approach we want to be explicit about 
the restrictions that we are imposing and not depend on informal restrictions (see Canova 
and de Nicoló (2002) and Faust (1998) for more on this topic). 
Several authors have previously used other identification schemes to study the 
impact of monetary policy shocks and money supply shocks on the housing market using 
VARs. Lastrapes (2002) studied the effect of money supply shocks on the housing market 
using two identification procedures. First, he assumed that money supply shocks were 
neutral in the long-run (long run restrictions as in Blanchard and Quah, 1989). Second, he 
assumed a block-recursive structure in which housing variables do not affect monetary 
policy contemporaneously. The results suggest that money supply shocks have a positive 
impact on different measures of house sales. The results are robust to the use of different 
identification schemes (see Lastrapes and Potts (2006) for more on the impact of money 
supply shocks in the housing market). Wheeler and Chowdhury (1993) and Hasan and   5
Taghavi (2002) used a recursive structure with the monetary policy variable before 
residential investment in the ordering to study the impact of macroeconomic variables in 
the housing market. Results based on variance decompositions and historical 
decompositions suggest that monetary policy has important effects on residential 
investment. 
Although these studies have provided valuable insights about the impact of 
monetary policy shocks and money supply shocks on the housing market, these studies 
imposed restrictions on the response of the housing variable to monetary policy shocks. 
We impose explicit restrictions on other variables, but not on the response of the housing 
variable. For comparison purposes we also present the results when the conventional 
Choleski decomposition is used to identify the monetary policy shock. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
and the identification procedure. Section 3 presents the impulse response functions when 
sign restrictions are imposed, while Section 4 reports the impulse response functions 
when the Choleski decomposition is used to identify the monetary policy shock. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Identification procedure and data description 
In the estimation we focus on identifying only the monetary policy shock. We do 
not aim to identify all structural shocks. That is, we want to identify one impulse vector. 
The identification is achieved imposing sign restrictions. We assume that following a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, the responses of prices, non-borrowed reserves 
and real GDP are non-positive, while the response of the federal funds rate is non-
negative for a certain period. No restrictions are placed on the response of the housing   6
activity variable. Please refer to the Appendix for more details about the estimation and 
to Uhlig (2005) for a complete discussion 
A critical choice in the estimation is for how long the restrictions should hold 
after the shock. There is no simple way of choosing one horizon over another. Therefore, 
we compare the results using different horizons. We present the results for horizons of 3, 
6, 9, 12 and 24 periods.
3 
Two alternative measures of housing market activity are used. The first measure 
is the number of new privately owned housing units starts (housing starts). The data used 
by the U.S. Census Bureau to construct this variable is obtained form the Survey of 
Construction (SOC). The SOC reports monthly estimates of housing starts. According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau in order to collect the data “Census Bureau ‘field representatives’ 
sample individual permits within a sample of permit offices. Then the builders or owners 
who took out the sampled permits are interviewed to obtain start and completion dates 
along with sale dates and characteristics such as size and number of bedrooms. In 
addition, within a sample of land areas where building permits are not required, field 
representatives drive all roads looking for new residential construction activity,” U.S. 
Census Bureau (2006).
4 
The second measure of housing market activity is the real private residential fixed 
investment (residential investment). According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
residential fixed investment “consists of all private residential structures and of 
residential equipment that is owned by landlords and rented to tenants. Residential 
                                                 
3 Faust (1998) also imposes sign restrictions on monetary policy shocks. Different from Uhlig (2005) the 
restrictions in Faust (1998) do not extend to various periods after the shock. 
4 As an alternative to housing starts, all the estimations were replicated using building permits. Results are 
consistent for both variables.   7
structures consists of new construction of permanent-site single family and multifamily 
units, improvements (additions, alterations, and major structural replacements) to housing 
units, expenditures on manufactured homes, brokers’ commissions on the sale of 
residential property, and net purchases of used structures from government agencies,” 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006). 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of these two measures of housing 
market activity. The first five rows in Table 1 report correlation coefficients between the 
growth rates of the two variables (including leads and lags of residential investment). The 
correlation between the measures of housing activity is about 24 percent, but decreases 
with lags of residential investment. 
<<Table 1>> 
As an alternative to the national level measures of housing activity we include a 
series of regional housing variables. The regional housing variables are housing starts in 
the Northeast, Midwest, South and West. Figure 2 plots housing starts divided by U.S. 
regions. The South is consistently the region with a larger number of housing starts. Since 
the beginning of the 1990s, housing starts in the other regions have remained at 
approximately the same level each year, while the South continues to grow. Notice also 
that for all regions there is a decrease in the volatility of housing starts since the 1980s. 
This decrease in volatility may be the result of the financial deregulation process of the 
U.S. Since the 1980s the housing finance system has gone from being a heavily regulated 
system to be a relatively unregulated system (McCarthy and Peach, 2002).
5  
<<Figure 2>> 
                                                 
5 It is also possible to argue that the impact of monetary policy shocks on the housing market has changed 
because of the financial deregulation process. See Hasan and Taghavi (2002), McCarthy and Peach (2002) 
and Wheeler and Chowdhury (1993) for more on that topic.     8
Each VAR includes one of the housing variables (housing starts or residential 
investment).
6 In addition, all VARs include the following variables: real GDP, house 
prices (price index of new one-family houses sold), the GDP price deflator, a commodity 
price index (Dow-Jones index of spot commodity prices), total reserves, non-borrowed 
reserves and the federal funds rate. These variables, with the exception of the commodity 
price index and house prices, are obtained from the database of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis. The commodity price index is obtained from Global Financial Data, Inc., 
while the house prices are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. The VAR is estimated 
in levels, which means that restrictions are imposed on the impulse response and not in 
the cumulative responses. The VAR includes 12 lags, the equivalent of a year. 
All variables are in monthly frequency for the period 1965:1 to 2005:12. Monthly 
observations for real GDP, the GDP deflator and residential investment are obtained by 
interpolation. The real GDP series is obtained by interpolation using industrial 
production. Monthly observations for the GDP deflator are obtained by interpolation 
using the consumer price index and the producer price index. Finally, monthly 
observations for real private residential fixed investment are obtained by interpolation 
using the number of new one-family houses sold.  The interpolation process follows 
Bernanke et al. (1997). The selection of the variables (with the exception of the housing 
variables) follows Bernanke and Mihov (1998a) and Uhlig (2005). All variables, with the 
exception of the federal funds rate, are used in logarithms. 
 
                                                 
6 We could also include both variables in the same estimation. However, this approach has two limitations. 
First, there is the problem of degrees of freedom given that our system has already eight variables. Second 
and more important, we have the issue of which of these variables we choose to impose sign restrictions 
and what is the possible impact on the other variable.    9
3. Results using the sign restrictions 
This article uses impulse response functions derived from a VAR to study the 
impact of monetary policy on the U.S. housing market. The identification procedure 
imposes restrictions on the response of the GDP deflator, house prices, a commodity 
price index, non-borrowed reserves, real GDP and the federal funds rate for a number of 
periods after a monetary policy shock. No restrictions are placed on the response of the 
measure of housing market activity (housing starts or residential investment). 
Figure 3 shows the response of the variables to a monetary policy shock when the 
housing market activity level is represented by housing starts. In Figure 3 and in the 
figures that follow, the upper and lower bounds represent a two-standard deviation band. 
Following Uhlig (2005), in the baseline model (Figure 3) the restrictions are imposed for 
six periods. The first period corresponds to the period of the shock. Hence, the 
restrictions are in place for five months after the initial shock. 
  Before examining how monetary policy impacts housing starts, we first review 
the impact of monetary policy on the other variables. Keep in mind that sign restrictions 
are used in the estimation. First, notice that within a year the federal funds rate raises by 
more than 30 basis points. The impact remains significant for about 8 months after the 
shock. This response of the federal funds rate is smaller than the estimated response in 
other studies related to the housing market. For instance, using a Choleski decomposition 
(with the federal funds rate as the monetary policy variable), Erceg and Levin (2006) 
estimated the initial response of the federal funds rate to be above 50 basis points. From 
Figure 3, we also see that the initial drop in non-borrowed reserves exceeds 1%. The   10
impact is significant for over 10 months. The initial impact on total reserves is negative 
and the initial drop in total reserves is less than 1%. 
  Now consider the impact on prices. The price deflator drops less than .10% after 
10 months and about .36% within 40 months. The drop in commodity prices is close to 
1% after 10 months and is significant for more than 30 months. House prices drop about 
.25% within 10 months and about .60% within 40 months. This contrasts with the initial 
positive response of house prices after a contractionary monetary policy shock obtained 
by McCarthy and Peach (2002). They referred to this result as a “home price puzzle.”
7 In 
our estimation the “home price puzzle” is avoided by construction. 
  None of these results seems to be particularly striking. This is, mainly, because 
we are imposing sign restrictions in the estimation. Our main interest, however, is with 
respect to the housing market activity variable. From Figure 3, we see that housing starts 
decrease after a contractionary monetary policy shock, but the response is only 
significant in one period and the initial drop is less than 1%. Thus, even with a decrease 
in house prices that lasts more than 40 months, the response of housing starts is short-
lived. 
<< Figure 3>> 
  In Figure 4, we substitute housing starts with residential investment. We want to 
check if the results for the housing activity variable are particular to housing starts or also 
hold for other measures of housing market activity. In general, the results in Figure 4 are 
similar to those in Figure 3, but there is an important difference. In contrast to the 
findings presented in Figure 3 (in which we included housings starts), residential 
investment is not responding significantly to the contractionary monetary policy shock. 
                                                 
7 The discussion on McCarthy and Peach (2002) is based on their post-1986 estimation.   11
<<Figure 4>> 
There are two important issues related with the previous estimations. First, we are 
using national level variables to measure housing activity. As we showed in Figure 2, 
there are important regional differences in the U.S. housing market. Second, the horizon 
for which the restrictions hold is selected ad-hoc. A different horizon for the restrictions 
may yield a different result. Next, we explore these two issues. 
3.1. Regional models 
Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999), among others, have suggested that the impact 
of monetary policy on the U.S. economy can differ across regions. Economic conditions 
prevailing at the time of the monetary policy shock may not be the same across regions. 
Moreover, the sensitivity of the regions to monetary policy shocks may be different. In 
Figure 5, we plot the response of housing starts by region, to a monetary policy shock. 
The horizon for the restrictions remains as six periods. 
In all regions, the initial response of housing starts to a contractionary monetary 
policy shock is negative. However, only in the Northeast and the Midwest is the response 
significant for more than one period. As we mentioned above, most of the housing 
activity in the U.S. is taking place in the South. This fact, combined with the similarity of 
the response of housing starts in the South, to the response of housing starts at the 
national level (see Figure 3) suggests that the dynamics of the U.S. housing market are 
largely driven by the South. The response of all other variables to the monetary policy 
shock is, in all cases, similar to the response reported in Figure 2.
8 
<< Figure 5>> 
                                                 
8 See Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) for more on the regional impact of monetary policy on the housing 
market.   12
3.2. Different horizons 
In the estimation the selection of the horizon for which the restrictions hold is ad-
hoc. Other authors using the same identification procedure have selected different 
horizons for the sign restrictions. For instance, Scholl and Uhlig (2006) used a 12 month 
horizon to study the impact of monetary policy on exchange rates, while Uhlig (2005) 
used horizons of 3, 6, 12 and 24 months to study the impact of monetary policy on 
output. For completeness, we must check the results using different horizons. Figure 6 
plots the response of housing starts (top) and residential investment (bottom), when the 
restrictions are imposed for 3, 9, 12 and 24 periods. Figure 6 indicates that as we expand 
the horizon under which the restrictions hold (i.e. longer horizon), the response of the 
housing market activity variable to a contractionary monetary policy shock lasts for a 
longer period. This is especially the case for residential investment. For instance, when 
the horizon is 3 periods the response of residential investment is not significant, while 
when the horizon is 9 periods the response is significant. In this case (horizon = 9), the 
initial drop in housing starts is close to 1%, while residential investment drops by about 
.5%. Moreover, when the horizon is 24 periods housing starts also drop by about 1%, 
while the drop in residential investment exceeds .5%.
9 
<< Figure 6 >> 
Several studies have previously reported a negative response of residential 
investment to monetary policy shocks. For instance, Erceg and Levin (2006) showed that 
the initial response to a contractionary monetary policy shock of an index of consumer 
durables and residential investment is negative (they estimated the drop to be close to .7 
                                                 
9 Similar results were obtained for the different regions. Results are available upon request.   13
percent). Iacoviello and Neri (2007) using a small-scale dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model estimated a drop in residential investment in response to a monetary 
policy shock that exceeded 3 percent. McCarthy and Peach (2002) estimated the initial 
drop of residential investment after a monetary policy shock to be close to 3 percent in 
both the pre-deregulation and post-deregulation periods. Our results suggest that the 
response is smaller (about .5 percent), but this does not necessarily imply a non-relevant 
response of the housing market to monetary policy shocks. Residential investment 
accounts for about 4 to 6 percent of GDP, which implies that a reduction of .5% in 
residential investment has important economic consequences. 
4. Results using the Choleski decomposition 
One of the main critiques of the Choleski decomposition is that it is not unique, 
which means that results for impulse response functions will depend on the ordering of 
the variables. A possible solution is to try different orderings and compare the impulse 
response functions for each ordering. But this will only be valid if it is known that the 
true model is recursive (rare in economics), and only the ordering is unknown (Fackler, 
1990).
10 
In order to impose a recursive structure, we must select the ordering of the 
variables. Furthermore, we have to choose one variable whose innovations will be 
interpreted as monetary policy shocks. Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), shocks to 
monetary policy are defined as a one-unit standard deviation shock to the federal funds 
                                                 
10 An alternative is to use generalized impulse response functions as in Pesaran and Shin (1998). See 
Ewing and Wang (2005) for an application of this methodology to the housing market.   14
rate.
  11 We use two alternative orderings in the estimation. The first ordering is: real 
GDP, housing variable, house prices, GDP price deflator, the commodity price index, the 
federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves and total reserves. In this case, nonborrowed 
reserves and total reserves respond contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks, while 
the other variables respond to innovations in monetary policy with one lag. In the second 
ordering we place the measure of housing market activity (housing starts or residential 
investment) after the federal funds rate. 
While for reasons of space we do not report the responses of all variables to a 
monetary policy shock under the recursive structure, a few words regarding the response 
of the federal funds rate are in order. The initial raise in the federal funds rate is above 60 
basis points, the impact remains close to 50 basis points after one year. This response is 
bigger than the response obtained under the sign restrictions and it is also closer to the 
response obtained by Erceg and Levin (2006).
12   
The responses of housing starts and residential investment under the recursive 
structure are presented in Figure 7. In both cases, the response is negative and significant. 
The response is significant for almost 30 months for housing starts and for about 40 
months for residential investment. In the estimations with the sign restrictions, only the 
response of residential investment when the restrictions horizon is 24 periods is 
significant for more than 30 months. In all other cases under the sign restrictions, the 
response lasts for a shorter period than the case with the Choleski decomposition. 
                                                 
11 Other papers (e.g. Christiano et al., 1996) prefer to use non-borrowed reserves as the monetary policy 
variable. See McMillin (2001) for a broader discussion on the selection of the monetary policy variable. 
12 A complete set of results using the Choleski decomposition is available from the authors upon request. 
The response of all the variables included in the estimation is similar across the alternative orderings.   15
It is also important to notice the difference in the size of the impact. Using the 
sign restrictions the initial drop in housing starts after the contractionary monetary policy 
shock is about 1%. The impact is much bigger in the case of the Choleski decomposition. 
With the Choleski, the initial impact is close to 3%. The impact is also bigger for 
residential investment. In the estimation with sign restrictions the estimated impact on 
residential investment is about .5%, while with the Choleski decomposition the estimated 
impact is close to 2%.  
<<Figure 7>> 
  There is also a difference in the fraction of the variance in housing that monetary 
policy shocks explain when sign restrictions and the Choleski decomposition are used. 
Using the Choleski decomposition, results from variance decompositions suggest that 
monetary policy shocks account for 11 to 14 % of the variations in housing starts. On the 
other hand, the sign restrictions approach indicates that monetary policy shocks account 
for only 4 to 5 % of the variations in housing, a fraction that is not significant.
13 
5. Summary and conclusion 
This article has examined the relationship between monetary policy and the U.S. 
housing market using an identification procedure similar to the one suggested by Uhlig 
(2005). The identification scheme imposes sign restrictions on the response of some of 
the variables for a number of periods after a monetary policy shock. We assume that 
shocks to monetary policy do not lead to increases in the GDP deflator, house prices, a 
commodity price index, non-borrowed reserves and real GDP, or decreases in the federal 
funds rate for a certain period. No restrictions are placed on the response of the housing 
                                                 
13 Other results from the variance decompositions suggest that monetary policy shocks explain about 10 % 
of the variation in housing prices after 24 periods. Results from variance decompositions are not shown but 
are available from the authors upon request.   16
market activity variable (housing starts or residential investment). The response of the 
housing variable is left “agnostically” open by the identification procedure. 
Overall, the results suggest that contractionary monetary policy shocks have a 
negative impact on housing starts and residential investment. The response is, in general, 
similar across U.S. regions. However, the impact of monetary policy on housing seems to 
be stronger in the Midwest. When the horizon for which the restrictions are imposed is 
expanded (to 9, 12 or 24 periods), the impact of a monetary policy shock lasts for a 
longer period (especially for residential investment).  
A comparison with the results obtained using the conventional Choleski 
decomposition reveals important differences. In the estimation with sign restrictions the 
response of the housing activity variable to a monetary policy shock is smaller and lasts 
for a shorter period than in the case with the Choleski decomposition. Moreover, there are 
cases under the sign restrictions for which we fail to find a significant response of the 
housing variable to the monetary policy shock. Once we become “agnostics” about the 
impact of monetary policy on the housing market, the results suggest that the impact is 
much less certain. 
   17
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Appendix 
What follows is a brief summary of Uhlig’s (2005) pure-sign-restriction 
methodology. Please refer to the original source for further details. We want to define a 
monetary policy impulse vector as one in which the sign restrictions hold. That is, a 
monetary policy impulse vector is an impulse vector, so that the responses of prices, real 
GDP and nonborrowed reserves are non-positive and the response of the federal funds 
rate is non-negative at all horizons  . ,.., 0 K k =  Because of identification issues, Uhlig 
recommends that we supplement the identification assumption by imposing a prior. The 
prior is proportional to a Normal-Wishart (see Uhlig (1994) for details). 
Empirically, the procedure is as follows: 
1)  Take n1 draws from the VAR posterior and n2 draws from an independent uniform 
prior (see Uhlig (2005) for details). 
2)  Construct the impulse vector. 
3)  For each draw, calculate the impulse responses at horizon  K k ,.., 0 = . 
4)  Check if the impulse response functions satisfy the sign restrictions. 
5)  If all the impulse response functions satisfy the sign restrictions keep the draw. If 
any of the impulse response functions do not satisfy the sign restrictions discard 
the draw. Stop after obtaining n3 impulse response functions with the desired sign. 
The error bands are calculated using the draws kept. 
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Figure 1 – Housing starts (thousand units, annualized) and recessions as determined by 
the NBER (shaded areas). Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Housing starts (thousand units, annualized) divided by regions. South (dashed), 
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Figure 3 – Response to a contractionary monetary policy shock one standard deviation in 
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Figure 4 – Response to a contractionary monetary policy shock one standard deviation in 
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Figure 5 – Response of housing starts by U.S. region to a contractionary monetary policy 
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Figure 6 – Response of housing starts and residential investment to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock one standard deviation in size, using different horizons for the 
restrictions. 
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Figure 7 – Response of housing starts and residential investment to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock using the Choleski decomposition. The monetary policy shock 
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  Housing Starts  Residential Investment 
Correlations    
Residential Investment (2 Leads)  28.7  58.6 
Residential Investment (1 Lead)  30.1  86.0 
Residential Investment  24.3  100.0 
Residential Investment (1 Lag)  14.5  86.0 
Residential Investment (2 Lags)  4.8  58.6 
Mean  1559.9 316.6 
Standard Deviation  337.2 105.6 
N  492 492 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of housings starts (thousand units, annualized), and 
residential investment (billion of chained 2000 dollars). Correlations are estimated using 
growth rates. 
 
 